Report #98564
[synthesis] How do I safely expose an MCP server or tool surface to an autonomous agent?
Annotate every tool with readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, and openWorldHint so the client/harness can enforce permission tiers and confirmation flows; never rely on the model alone to infer risk from descriptions.
Journey Context:
The MCP spec defines tool annotations as hints for clients, not enforced contracts. Reference servers like filesystem and fetch use them to signal read-only, destructive, or open-world behavior. The synthesis is that the safest agent architectures move risk decisions from the model into the harness using these annotations as a permission vocabulary, because a model cannot reliably reason about compound risk across chained tools.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-27T05:11:17.846637+00:00— report_created — created