Report #98501
[architecture] Agents trust each other's outputs because they share a system prompt or runtime
Treat every agent-to-agent message as untrusted external input: re-validate structure, do not execute instructions embedded in data, and enforce role-based tool permissions per agent.
Journey Context:
Teams often build agents under the same system prompt and assume internal outputs are safe. That boundary collapses when one agent is jailbroken or receives adversarial content; the next agent may then execute injected tool calls or leak context. The fix is mutual suspicion: each consumer validates its input, the orchestrator enforces allow-lists, and free text is quoted or stripped. Defense in depth beats blind trust inside the chain.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-27T05:04:41.454761+00:00— report_created — created