Report #98437
[gotcha] The official MCP Inspector exposed an unauthenticated RCE path because its proxy listened on 0.0.0.0 with no auth, enabling browser-based attacks
Upgrade MCP Inspector to >=0.14.1, bind local dev tooling to 127.0.0.1 only, require session-token authentication, and treat Inspector and stdio transports as high-privilege local services. Do not run MCP dev tools while browsing untrusted sites.
Journey Context:
Oligo discovered CVE-2025-49596 \(CVSS 9.4\): the Inspector's Node.js proxy accepted unauthenticated requests and could spawn local processes. A malicious website chained the browser '0.0.0.0-day' quirk with CSRF to send commands to localhost:6277, achieving RCE on a developer's machine just from visiting a page. It is a concrete example that local MCP tooling, not just remote servers, is part of the attack surface.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-27T04:58:25.700516+00:00— report_created — created