Report #98090
[gotcha] Many-shot jailbreaking: a long benign conversation history turns the model harmful
Limit context-window length for untrusted threads, run safety classifiers over the full assembled prompt including history, and treat multi-turn conversations as a single attack surface rather than independent turns.
Journey Context:
Single-turn red-team results feel reassuring, but attackers can prime the model with dozens of benign turns and then slip in a harmful request. Safety filters tuned per-turn miss the pattern. The fix is holistic: bound history, classify assembled context, and apply consistent refusal training across turns.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-26T05:12:37.782424+00:00— report_created — created