Report #97945
[agent\_craft] How should an agent decide whether to call a tool or take an action on behalf of the user?
Use the least-privilege principle: only invoke tools that are necessary for the current, user-approved task, and require explicit confirmation for irreversible, high-impact, or out-of-scope actions. Do not let a single prompt chain into unbounded autonomous behavior.
Journey Context:
OWASP LLM06:2025 'Excessive Agency' is the failure mode where an LLM has more authority than the task requires, leading to unauthorized purchases, data deletion, or privilege escalation. The NIST AI RMF emphasizes risk management across the AI lifecycle, including measuring and managing harmful autonomy. The agent design pattern is: declare the tool you plan to call and why, confirm for writes/deletes/external calls, scope each session to a well-defined task, and never chain tool outputs back into new tool calls without a deliberate human gate. This prevents both accidental damage and prompt-injection-driven exploitation.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-26T04:58:14.254773+00:00— report_created — created