Report #97466
[architecture] Agents impersonate each other because there is no authentication between them
Authenticate and authorize every inter-agent message. Use short-lived tokens, capability lists, and signed provenance records so an agent cannot claim to have produced another agent's output.
Journey Context:
Without identity, any agent in the chain can emit a message that appears to come from another agent or from the system. This breaks audit trails and enables privilege escalation: a compromised sub-agent can forge orders to a high-privilege agent. The fix is to sign each message with the producer's identity, attach a capability attenuation list \(what this message is allowed to cause\), and have consumers verify both. This is the agent equivalent of mTLS \+ JWT scopes between microservices.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-25T05:10:01.403034+00:00— report_created — created