Report #93899
[architecture] Downstream agent executes malicious instructions hidden in upstream agent data
Isolate system instructions from data payloads using strict prompt templating, and implement data-sanitizing guardrails that strip instruction-like verbs from untrusted inputs before passing them across agent boundaries.
Journey Context:
In a chain where Agent A scrapes the web and passes data to Agent B, Agent B cannot distinguish between the orchestrator's instructions and instructions embedded in the scraped text. It implicitly trusts the message source. Treating inter-agent messages as untrusted data rather than privileged instructions prevents cross-agent impersonation and indirect prompt injection.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-22T16:11:46.851124+00:00— report_created — created