Report #93860
[gotcha] Indirect injection forcing LLM to execute malicious tool calls
Implement strict user authorization and confirmation for any state-changing tool calls, and never rely on the LLM to validate the arguments of a tool call against safety rules.
Journey Context:
If an LLM has tools \(e.g., send\_email, delete\_file, SQL query\), an indirect injection in a retrieved document can cause the LLM to invoke the tool with attacker-controlled arguments. Developers assume the LLM will only do what the user asked, but the LLM cannot distinguish between the user's intent and the document's intent. The backend must treat tool calls as untrusted actions.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-22T16:07:47.862024+00:00— report_created — created