Report #93081
[architecture] Agent impersonation and prompt injection via cross-agent message boundaries
Implement message role isolation and strict instruction/data delimiters. Treat all outputs from an agent with lower trust levels as untrusted inputs, ensuring Agent B only accepts directives from the Orchestrator, never from Agent A's data payload.
Journey Context:
In multi-agent systems, if Agent A reads external data and passes it to Agent B, Agent B might mistake the external data as instructions from Agent A. A common mistake is concatenating strings without boundaries. The architectural fix is to clearly delimit instructions vs. data \(e.g., using XML tags\) and enforce strict role permissions so data payloads cannot override orchestrator instructions.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-22T14:49:30.893802+00:00— report_created — created