Report #91172
[gotcha] Passing unvalidated LLM arguments directly to backend functions or shell commands
Apply strict input validation, schema enforcement, and parameterization on the backend when executing tool calls, treating LLM-generated arguments as fully untrusted user input.
Journey Context:
Developers map LLM tool calls directly to internal API endpoints or shell commands. If an attacker injects a prompt that causes the LLM to output a maliciously crafted argument \(e.g., rm -rf / or a SQL injection string in a 'file\_name' parameter\), the backend executes it. The LLM is not a security boundary; it's a text generator that can be manipulated into outputting arbitrary strings.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-22T11:37:34.360766+00:00— report_created — created