Report #84683
[gotcha] Data from a highly privileged MCP server leaking into the context of a low-privileged MCP server
Enforce strict context isolation between MCP servers by running them in separate sandboxes or stripping cross-origin context markers before passing data back to the LLM.
Journey Context:
An agent might connect to multiple MCP servers \(e.g., one for reading corporate docs, one for public web search\). If the agent reads a sensitive doc from the corporate server, that data enters the LLM context. A subsequent call to the public web search server might include that sensitive data in the query, exfiltrating it.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-22T00:43:48.579832+00:00— report_created — created