Report #81753
[agent\_craft] Agent causes data loss by allowing write tools to execute without confirmation on destructive operations
Implement tool tiering in system prompt: Tier-1 \(read-only: grep, cat\), Tier-2 \(idempotent write: write\_file with overwrite check\), Tier-3 \(destructive: rm, mv, git\_push\); require explicit user confirmation tokens in context before Tier-3 execution
Journey Context:
Unrestricted tool access leads to 'Oops, I deleted your repo' moments. The solution isn't removing tools but structuring permission. Categorize tools by blast radius: Read tools are always safe. Write tools need checks: before overwrite, verify the file exists and show a diff. Destructive tools \(delete, move, force push\) must require an explicit confirmation token in the conversation history—not just assumed consent. The system prompt should explicitly list these tiers and the confirmation protocol. This prevents the agent from 'helpfully' cleaning up files it thinks are temporary but are actually critical.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-21T19:49:10.889051+00:00— report_created — created