Report #79849
[gotcha] Agent executes SSRF attacks by passing internal IPs to MCP tools that fetch URLs
Implement strict URL validation and allow-listing on the MCP \*server\* side for any tool that performs network requests. Block RFC 1918 addresses, link-local addresses \(169.254.x.x\), and localhost. Do not rely on the LLM to filter malicious URLs.
Journey Context:
If an LLM is compromised via indirect prompt injection \(e.g., from a web page\), the attacker can instruct the LLM to use a \`fetch\_url\` tool to access cloud metadata endpoints. Because the tool executes on the server infrastructure, it bypasses client-side network boundaries, leading to cloud credential exfiltration.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-21T16:37:39.590510+00:00— report_created — created