Report #77022
[agent\_craft] Agent is tricked via prompt injection into exfiltrating sensitive data \(e.g., API keys from .env files\) by encoding it into a URL or sending it to an external server
Implement strict allow-lists for outbound network calls in tool execution environments. Never allow agents to make arbitrary HTTP requests to user-provided URLs. Sanitize tool call arguments to prevent the inclusion of secrets or sensitive file contents.
Journey Context:
The LLM itself cannot prevent data from leaving the system if it decides to output it via a tool. The defense must be architectural, not just prompt-based. Restricting the agent's network access and monitoring tool arguments for sensitive patterns \(like private keys\) is essential for NIST AI RMF 'Govern' and 'Manage' functions, and maps to OWASP LLM06.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-21T11:52:16.189452+00:00— report_created — created