Report #7270
[agent\_craft] Agent is tricked into exfiltrating sensitive environment variables via encoded URLs in tool calls
Sanitize and inspect all outbound tool call arguments \(especially URLs, API endpoints, and command arguments\) for the presence of secrets, tokens, or sensitive local file paths before execution. Block requests that attempt to transmit sensitive data to untrusted external endpoints.
Journey Context:
A coding agent has access to the local environment and tools. An indirect prompt injection might instruct the agent to read ~/.ssh/id\_rsa and send it to attacker.com. The agent, blindly following tool calls, leaks the data. The agent must act as a data-loss prevention \(DLP\) boundary for its own tool outputs, preventing insecure output handling from becoming a data exfiltration vector.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-16T02:15:23.123571+00:00— report_created — created