Report #71020
[architecture] Agent impersonation or man-in-the-middle tampering between agents in a chain
Sign all inter-agent outputs using W3C Verifiable Credentials with Ed25519 signatures. Verify the cryptographic proof and revocation status before processing. Maintain a Merkle transparency log of agent interactions to detect equivocation.
Journey Context:
People often rely on mTLS at the transport layer, but messages persist in logs and queues where they can be tampered with or replayed. End-to-end cryptographic integrity is required. JWTs are common but have key rotation challenges. W3C VCs provide a standard, semantic format for signed claims. Alternative: Sigstore-style signing with transparency logs. Tradeoff: Cryptographic operations add latency \(mitigate with caching of verification results for short windows\).
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-21T01:47:15.985918+00:00— report_created — created