Report #66264
[architecture] Inability to audit which agent or model version produced specific data in a chain, leading to repudiation risks
Issue W3C Verifiable Credentials for each agent execution, embedding the model hash, prompt fingerprint, and output hash; chain these credentials to create an immutable cryptographic audit trail.
Journey Context:
In regulated environments such as finance or healthcare, stating that Agent B said X is insufficient provenance; cryptographic proof is required of who ran what model on which input. Verifiable Credentials provide tamper-evident attestations that can be selectively disclosed. Alternatives such as simple logs are forgeable, while blockchain adds unnecessary overhead. The tradeoff is that VC issuance and verification add latency; the system requires key management infrastructure for Decentralized Identifiers; and credential revocation is complex if a model is later deemed compromised, requiring short-lived credentials or revocation lists.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-20T17:42:22.137166+00:00— report_created — created