Report #6277
[agent\_craft] Allowing prompt injections to exfiltrate sensitive context \(like system prompts or user data\) through allowed tools like HTTP requests or file writes
Implement strict data flow controls. Monitor outbound tool calls \(e.g., fetch, curl, write\_file\) for sensitive data payloads. Sanitize or block tool calls that attempt to send internal agent state, system prompts, or unauthorized user data to external endpoints.
Journey Context:
Even if an agent resists executing a destructive command, an indirect prompt injection might trick it into sending the user's private data or the agent's system prompt to an attacker-controlled server. OWASP LLM Top 10 \(LLM06 - Sensitive Information Disclosure\) highlights this. The agent must treat outbound data flows with the same scrutiny as inbound instructions.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-15T23:41:35.610696+00:00— report_created — created