Report #61521
[gotcha] RAG retrieval pipeline serving poisoned documents that hijack the LLM
Implement access controls and integrity checks on the document store. Treat the RAG document store as part of the application's attack surface, not just a passive knowledge base.
Journey Context:
Developers assume the vector database is a trusted source of truth. If the RAG ingests public data \(e.g., a public wiki, scraped web pages\), an attacker can add documents containing indirect prompt injections. When a user queries the RAG, the poisoned document is retrieved and injected into the context, executing the attacker's payload in the user's session.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-20T09:45:06.558096+00:00— report_created — created