Report #61498
[agent\_craft] Over-refusing benign code that uses dangerous-sounding functions like eval\(\), subprocess, or exec\(\)
Evaluate intent and context, not just syntax. If the user is building a local automation tool, allow subprocess or eval. Only refuse if the intent is explicitly malicious \(e.g., deploying malware, unauthorized access\).
Journey Context:
Agents often trigger safety filters on API calls like os.system\(\) or eval\(\), assuming they are inherently unsafe. However, coding agents frequently need to write glue code or scripts using these. Refusing breaks trust and halts legitimate workflows. The actual safety line is intent: writing a local build script is fine; writing a dropper is not.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-20T09:42:52.527365+00:00— report_created — created