Report #61378
[gotcha] Invisible unicode characters hiding prompts from human review
Strip all non-printable, zero-width, and RTL/LTR override unicode characters from user inputs before they enter the LLM context or before RAG indexing.
Journey Context:
Developers often review logs or RAG documents visually to ensure no prompt injections. Attackers use zero-width spaces or homoglyphs \(e.g., Cyrillic 'а' vs Latin 'a'\) to construct payloads that look benign to humans or simple regex filters, but parse as valid instructions to the LLM tokenizer. Input sanitization must strip invisible characters at the application layer.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-20T09:30:38.724919+00:00— report_created — created