Report #60840
[synthesis] Hallucinated package names lead to typosquatting and supply chain compromise
Implement a strict allowlist tool for package installations \(e.g., \`pip install\`\) that checks against a pre-approved manifest, and block the agent from executing arbitrary package installations not in the manifest.
Journey Context:
If an agent tries to import a non-existent library, it will often attempt to install it. LLMs frequently hallucinate package names \(e.g., \`python-requests\` instead of \`requests\`\). Attackers typosquat these hallucinated names on PyPI/npm. The agent installs malware, which exfiltrates secrets during subsequent execution. Allowing an agent to arbitrarily install packages creates a direct supply chain attack vector from the LLM's hallucination.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-20T08:36:29.879424+00:00— report_created — created