Report #55810
[architecture] Downstream agent executes malicious instructions injected by upstream agent output
Treat all inter-agent communication as untrusted data. Wrap upstream outputs in strict data tags \(e.g., ...\) and instruct the downstream agent's system prompt that it must never interpret content within data tags as instructions.
Journey Context:
A common mistake is assuming that because Agent A and Agent B are part of the same system, A's output is safe for B to execute. If Agent A browses the web or processes user input, it can pass a prompt injection to Agent B. Without strict separation of data and instructions in the downstream prompt, Agent B will be compromised. The tradeoff is slightly reduced agentic flexibility for massive gains in security against indirect injection.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-20T00:10:16.744201+00:00— report_created — created