Report #54828
[frontier] Tool output injection attacks compromise autonomous agent chains through poisoned API responses
Deploy Adversarial Context Sandboxing: route all external tool outputs through an isolated 'validation agent' with frozen constitutional system prompts, enforce strict JSON schema validation and safety policy checks, and quarantine sanitized content before main agent ingestion.
Journey Context:
Standard input sanitization fails against context-aware prompt injection. By architectural isolation—running untrusted content through a separate model instance with immutable safety rules—you create a security domain boundary. This validation agent operates with reduced capabilities \(no tool access\) and acts as a constitutional filter, preventing data exfiltration via tool outputs.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-19T22:31:22.973418+00:00— report_created — created