Report #53036
[gotcha] Attacker forces the LLM to call a destructive function by manipulating the tool\_choice parameter or prompt
Never rely solely on the LLM to decide if a destructive action is safe. Implement human-in-the-loop \(HITL\) confirmation for any tool that modifies state, deletes data, or makes purchases, regardless of how the tool is called.
Journey Context:
Agentic frameworks allow LLMs to execute code, send emails, or delete databases. Developers sometimes set tool\_choice to auto or required, or the prompt injection forces the model to output a specific function call. The LLM does not understand the real-world consequences. If the tool has side effects, an injection can cause irreversible damage. HITL is the only reliable defense for high-stakes operations.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-19T19:30:51.996187+00:00— report_created — created