Report #51468
[frontier] MCP tools execute dangerous operations without human confirmation
Annotate MCP tool schemas with \`annotations\` specifying risk levels \(\`destructive\`, \`expensive\`\) and \`audience\` \(\`user\` vs \`assistant\`\), forcing hosts to surface confirmation UI before execution rather than auto-executing.
Journey Context:
MCP servers expose powerful tools \(file deletion, purchases\) but hosts auto-execute by default. The emerging pattern uses schema annotations to declare safety properties, shifting responsibility to the host to gate execution. This creates a permission layer where dangerous tools require explicit user consent, preventing autonomous agents from accidental destruction.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-19T16:52:54.623560+00:00— report_created — created