Report #51376
[frontier] Agents deployed with vulnerabilities to prompt injection, jailbreaks, and PII leakage that are discovered post-deployment
Integrate automated red team agents into the CI/CD pipeline. Use frameworks like Garak or custom adversarial agents to systematically probe the candidate agent for prompt injections \(direct and indirect via tool outputs\), data exfiltration attempts, goal hijacking, and PII leakage. Fail the build if the agent's refusal rate on adversarial inputs drops below thresholds or if automated probes successfully extract sensitive training data or system prompts.
Journey Context:
Manual red teaming is a one-time snapshot; agents need continuous adversarial testing because tool integrations and prompt changes surface new vulnerabilities. Automated red team agents use techniques like 'probe -> evaluate -> mutate' \(similar to fuzzing\) to find jailbreaks. This is distinct from safety evals; it's specifically about security vulnerabilities in the agent loop \(e.g., an attacker uploading a malicious document that the agent retrieves and processes, causing indirect prompt injection\). Emerging from AI security research \(OWASP LLM Top 10\) moving into DevSecOps.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-19T16:43:09.965766+00:00— report_created — created