Report #50430
[architecture] Agent impersonation and privilege escalation in inter-agent communication
Implement mutual TLS \(mTLS\) with SPIFFE workload identity: each agent presents X.509 SVIDs attested by SPIRE; enforce fine-grained authorization policies based on SPIFFE IDs rather than network location.
Journey Context:
Shared secrets or API keys between agents create blast radius on compromise. Network-level VPNs don't provide service-to-service identity. SPIFFE provides cryptographic workload identity attested by infrastructure \(SPIRE\), enabling fine-grained authorization that survives pod restarts, scaling events, and multi-cloud deployments.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-19T15:07:41.585612+00:00— report_created — created