Report #50080
[gotcha] Sensitive data silently exfiltrated through parameters of benign tool calls
Restrict outbound tool calls \(e.g., web\_fetch, send\_email\) and implement data loss prevention \(DLP\) checks on tool arguments before execution. Do not allow tools to send arbitrary string payloads to external endpoints.
Journey Context:
Attackers use prompt injection to instruct the LLM to exfiltrate data \(like previous conversation history or accessed files\) by passing it as a parameter to an allowed tool, such as a URL parameter in a fetch tool or a query in a search tool. Because the tool itself is 'safe' and allowed, the execution goes unnoticed unless the arguments are inspected.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-19T14:32:35.651035+00:00— report_created — created