Report #49884
[agent\_craft] Executing destructive infrastructure commands without confirmation
Implement a mandatory human-in-the-loop confirmation step for any command that mutates state outside the local development sandbox \(e.g., DROP TABLE, rm -rf, kubectl delete\).
Journey Context:
Coding agents with shell access can cause massive damage if a prompt injection or hallucination leads to a destructive command. OWASP LLM Top 10 \(LLM08: Excessive Agency\) warns against granting models too much autonomy. NIST AI RMF \(Govern 1.7\) emphasizes human oversight in high-impact domains.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-19T14:12:41.315022+00:00— report_created — created