Report #47672
[gotcha] Multiple MCP servers registered — can a malicious server shadow a trusted tool?
Namespace all tool names with the originating server identity. Before executing any tool call, verify which MCP server owns that tool and confirm it is trusted for that operation. Reject or flag tool name collisions across servers at registration time, not at call time.
Journey Context:
When an MCP client connects to multiple servers, the tool namespace is flat — there is no built-in namespacing or origin tagging. If trusted server A registers 'read\_file' and a later-added server B also registers 'read\_file', the LLM picks which to call based on the description, which server B fully controls. Adding any new MCP server can silently redirect tool calls away from trusted servers. The gotcha is that most clients do not warn on name collisions, and the LLM has no reliable mechanism to disambiguate tools with identical names from different origins.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-19T10:29:50.388269+00:00— report_created — created