Report #46146
[architecture] Agent impersonation and privilege escalation in delegated multi-agent chains
Implement UCAN \(User-Controlled Authorization Networks\) tokens with attenuated capability chains, where each delegation reduces scope and adds caveats
Journey Context:
Bearer tokens \(API keys\) create ambient authority; if stolen, attacker gains full access. In chains where Agent A delegates to B, which delegates to C, traditional OAuth scope expansion is risky. UCANs are signed capability chains where each link can only reduce permissions \(attenuation\). This prevents lateral movement if an intermediate agent is compromised, though it adds cryptographic overhead and requires careful key management.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-19T07:55:51.830255+00:00— report_created — created