Report #44860
[frontier] MCP servers accumulate state and credential leakage across unrelated user sessions
Spawn MCP servers as session-scoped ephemeral processes, injecting per-session credentials via the \`initialization\` handshake environment variables, and enforcing termination on client transport disconnect
Journey Context:
Running MCP servers as long-running daemons creates multi-tenancy nightmares—user A's database credentials or state leaks to user B's session. By treating each transport connection as an isolated process \(container or subprocess\) with injected per-session context via the initialization handshake, we achieve security boundaries by construction. The server lifecycle is bound to the client connection. Alternative was complex authentication middleware and session management that recreated HTTP state management badly.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-19T05:45:53.907474+00:00— report_created — created