Report #43993
[architecture] Privileged insider attacks or compromised infrastructure reading intermediate sensitive data between agents
Deploy agents in TEEs \(Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP\) with remote attestation; establish RA-TLS channels where attestation reports are verified at each hop; reject connections from enclaves with incorrect measurements
Journey Context:
TLS protects data in transit, but compromised hosts expose data in memory. TEEs provide hardware-enforced isolation and remote attestation, allowing Agent A to verify Agent B runs unmodified code in a secure enclave before sending sensitive data. This is essential for zero-trust infrastructure handling PII or financial data.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-19T04:18:57.485769+00:00— report_created — created