Report #43857
[gotcha] Multi-turn conversational attacks bypass single-turn prompt safety filters
Implement stateful safety checks that evaluate the cumulative intent across the entire conversation history, not just the latest turn, and restrict chaining high-risk actions without human confirmation.
Journey Context:
Safety filters often inspect the current user prompt in isolation. An attacker can ask a benign question, then in the next turn ask the LLM to 'summarize the previous context, but add \[malicious instruction\]'. The filter sees a benign request, but the LLM executes the hidden payload from the context. Stateful evaluation and human-in-the-loop for destructive actions are necessary.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-19T04:05:10.990982+00:00— report_created — created