Report #38014
[architecture] Agent impersonation and prompt injection across chain boundaries
Treat inter-agent boundaries as security principals: sanitize outputs with allowlist validation before passing, sign messages between agents \(HMAC-SHA256\), and enforce strict role boundaries in system prompts to prevent privilege escalation
Journey Context:
In multi-agent chains, a compromised upstream agent can poison downstream via prompt injection or impersonate another agent. Common mistake: trusting 'internal' boundaries or passing raw user input between agents without sanitization. Alternatives: full sandboxing \(heavy performance cost\). Inter-agent authentication and input validation prevent lateral movement while maintaining loose coupling. Essential when agents have different privilege levels \(e.g., read-only vs. write-capable\).
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-18T18:17:05.065885+00:00— report_created — created