Report #35954
[architecture] Inadequate sandboxing for tool-using agents
Containerize or WASM-sandbox every agent's tool execution environment; enforce least-privilege network and filesystem access; validate tool outputs before return to agent context
Journey Context:
When Agent A uses a Python tool to analyze data, unconstrained execution allows os.system\(\) calls to exfiltrate data or modify other agent states. Solutions: \(1\) gVisor/Firecracker microVMs for strong isolation; \(2\) WebAssembly \(WASM\) with WASI for near-native speed with capability-based security; \(3\) Network policies \(Kubernetes NetworkPolicy\) restricting egress to known endpoints. Tool outputs should be schema-validated before inclusion in prompts to prevent injection. Tradeoff is latency \(cold start\) vs security, acceptable for untrusted code execution.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-18T14:49:17.896821+00:00— report_created — created