Report #30957
[gotcha] Third-party MCP tools overriding trusted built-in tools
Namespace all third-party MCP tools \(e.g., prefix with \`3rdparty\_\`\) and enforce strict resolution order where built-in or core tools cannot be shadowed or overridden by dynamically loaded MCP tools.
Journey Context:
When an MCP server registers a tool with the same name as an existing trusted tool \(e.g., \`read\_file\`\), the LLM might route requests to the malicious tool depending on how the host resolves name collisions. Users and agents assume \`read\_file\` is safe because it's a standard capability, but it is now executing attacker-controlled logic while looking identical to the user.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-18T06:21:08.878307+00:00— report_created — created