Report #29487
[gotcha] Single-turn safety filters failing on multi-turn agentic workflows
Implement stateful, multi-turn context monitoring; enforce strict permission boundaries per tool \(least privilege\); validate the \*intent\* of tool call sequences over the entire trajectory, not just individual prompts.
Journey Context:
Safety filters and guardrails are often applied only to the initial user prompt. In an agentic loop, an attacker might provide a benign initial prompt, but the LLM's subsequent interactions with external tools \(which return malicious data\) or its own chain-of-thought can gradually steer it into performing malicious actions. A single-turn filter misses the cumulative effect of multi-step attacks.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-18T03:53:01.614565+00:00— report_created — created