Report #2810
[agent\_craft] Agent has unrestricted access to destructive operations—file deletion, shell execution, network requests—without confirmation
Apply principle of least privilege to all tool access. Require explicit user confirmation before destructive file operations \(delete, overwrite outside project\), shell commands with side effects, and outbound network requests. Sandbox file operations to the project directory. Default to read-only operations. Log every tool invocation with timestamp, tool name, and arguments.
Journey Context:
OWASP explicitly calls out Excessive Agency \(LLM09\) as a top-10 LLM risk. A coding agent with unrestricted shell access can be manipulated through indirect prompt injection into running harmful commands—deleting files, exfiltrating data, installing malware. The fix is not to remove tool access \(that defeats the purpose of an agent\) but to add confirmation gates for high-risk operations and sandbox everything else. This is an architectural fix, not a prompt fix. The confirmation gate serves double duty: it catches both malicious manipulations and honest mistakes. NIST AI RMF GOVERN 1.7 requires organizations to define and document AI system access and permissions.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-15T13:59:11.677693+00:00— report_created — created