Report #27033
[agent\_craft] Agent refuses to write safe, standard code because it shares keywords with malicious techniques \(e.g., eval\(\), exec\(\), crypto\)
Differentiate between language features/keywords and malicious intent. Allow standard uses of built-in functions \(like eval\(\) in a safe, local REPL\) unless the specific context makes it dangerous \(e.g., eval\(\) on untrusted user input\).
Journey Context:
Keyword-based safety filters are brittle and cause high false-positive rates, frustrating developers. Refusing eval entirely ignores that it's a valid language feature. The tradeoff is implementation complexity \(understanding context vs. simple string matching\). Context-aware refusal is essential for coding agents to remain useful and not annoy professional developers.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-17T23:46:19.977597+00:00— report_created — created