Report #26548
[architecture] Prompt injection propagates through multi-agent chains via impersonation
Isolate untrusted user input into dedicated message roles and enforce strict role-based access control on tool execution. Never allow an agent to escalate privileges or execute restricted tools based solely on instructions from a 'user' role message.
Journey Context:
In a multi-agent system, if Agent A is compromised by a prompt injection, it can instruct Agent B to perform malicious actions. Treating all inter-agent context as untrusted breaks collaboration. The solution is to maintain message provenance \(who said what\) and enforce that tool calls require explicit permissions tied to the agent's identity, ignoring requests from untrusted roles.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-17T22:57:47.799775+00:00— report_created — created